Comment on "On the proper behavior of atoms" by Paul Anglin by Standish, Russell K. & Keen, Stephen L.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
9.
33
69
v1
  [
nli
n.A
O]
  1
3 S
ep
 20
13
Comment on “On the proper behavior of atoms”
by Paul Anglin
Russell K. Standish
Mathematics and Statistics, University of New South Wales
Stephen L. Keen
Economics and Finance, University of Western Sydney
November 21, 2018
Abstract
Paul Anglin criticised our analysis of the neoclassical theory of the
firm, but makes a number of incorrect assertions about our assumptions.
We correct these misunderstandings, but acknowledge that one criticism
he makes is correct. We correct this flaw with a new argument that
supersedes the flawed strategic reaction argument we presented in our
previous paper.
1 The profit formula
We take as our starting point, the usual profit formula of a single product market
with n firms:
pii = qiP (Q)−
∫ qi
0
MC(qi)dqi, (1)
where pii is the profit obtained by firm i, as a function of its production qi,
and the total market production Q =
∑
i qi. The function P (Q) is the demand
curve, namely the price the good achieves when Q items of the good is available
on the market. The function MC(qi) is the marginal cost of producing an extra
item of the good, given that a firm is producing qi items.
2 The trouble with derivatives
In [1], Paul Anglin critiques our paper [4]. We note a number of problems with
this critique.
Anglin’s initial proposition is that our results depend on the size of the
increment to output for each firm:
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I suggest that a flawed premise is being used since it is also true
that the effect on P would be about 100 times larger if the change
in output by a single firm increased from dqi = 1 to 100. So, before
analyzing the effect of a change by a mass of firm, a more relevant
question is: is dqi = 1 or 100 (or −1 or −100)?[1, p. 278]
However, our argument was based not on discrete changes to output but
on derivatives. The dqi he mentions is “infinitesimal”: it cannot be equal to 1
or 100. In any case, we do not use “infinitesimals”, which are mathematically
problematic, but regular derivatives, which in the case of a multivariate function
y(q1, . . . , qn) can be either partial ∂y/∂qi or total dy/dx.
In footnote 1, Anglin conjectures that the relation dqi/dQ =
∑
j ∂qi/∂qj
“seems to be a consequence of the fact that Q =
∑
j qj” [1, p. 278]. In comments
he made on a previous version of this paper, it would appear that this is the
crux of his disagreement with our analysis. In [4], we effectively assumed that
dqi
dQ
=
∑
j
∂qi
∂qj
= 1 (2)
in going from equation (4) to (6) in that paper. On reflection, we realise this
criticism is correct — there is no justification for assuming dqi/dQ has any
particular value. Nevertheless, the Keen result (eq 6 of [4]) can still be derived
as the system equilibrium assuming a much weaker additional condition that
dqi/dQ = dqj/dQ, ∀i, j holds at equilibrium.
3 Symmetry of firms
In footnote 2 of [1], Anglin asserts we made a symmetry assumption Q = nqi,
from which he derives an inconsistency. We did not make this assumption at any
point in our paper. In the referees comments he made on an earlier version of
this paper, it would appear that this is a derived consequence of our assumption
that dqi/dQ = 1. Coupled with the boundary condition Q = 0 ⇒ qi = 0 and
integrating, this would imply qi = Q/n.
However, since the Keen equilibrium only requires that dqi/dQ = dqj/dQ, ∀i, j
at equilibrium, there is no specific requirement for the market to be evenly
shared amongst the firms, except in the case of constant marginal cost, as de-
tailed in section 6.
We do assume that each firm has identical marginal cost functions MC(qi),
which is also assumed in the traditional presentation of the Cournot profit max-
imum. This is for pedagogical convenience however, the argument presented in
section 6 does not depend on this assumption, and can be easily generalised.
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4 Total derivative with respect to industry out-
put rather than single firm’s output
The traditional analysis of the Marshallian and Cournot models is to to hy-
pothesize behavior by the individual firm such that it sets the partial derivative
∂pii/∂qi = 0 (see e.g. [4, eq (2)]); in the Marshallian model this is described
as “atomistic” profit-maximizing behavior, while in the Cournot model it is de-
scribed as a constrained profit level in response to the strategic responses of
other firms. The Marshallian proposition is strictly false, since the profit of
a single firm pii is a function of all n firms’ outputs qi, not a single variable
function, whether or not the individual firm can in fact affect the behavior of
other firms. The extrema of an n-variable function is found at the zero of the
derivative, ie when all partial derivatives ∂pii/∂qj = 0. However
∂pii/∂qj = δij(P −MC) + qiP
′ (3)
which can never be satisfied where qi > 0 and P
′ < 0. The condition ∂pii/∂qi = 0
describes an unstable equilibrium — it is vulnerable to firms pulling in the same
direction, which can happen even in the absence of explicit collusion [5].
Instead we propose the condition that all firm’s profits are maximised with
respect to total industry output dpii/dQ = 0. This constrains the dynamics
of firms’ outputs to an n − 1-dimensional polyhedron, but otherwise does not
specify what the individual firms should do. As an equilibrium condition, it is
vulnerable to a single firm “stealing” market share. However, no firm acts in
isolation. The other firms will react, negating the benefit obtained by first firm,
causing the system to settle back to the dpii/dQ = 0 manifold.
5 Conjectural Variation
In our paper, we introduce the idea of firms reacting to the production deci-
sions of their competitors by introducing a dependence between our previous
independent variables qi. We thank Anglin for reminding us of considerable
previous history of doing this under the name of “conjectural variation”; how-
ever, this was a literature of which we were already aware, and whose use of
the concept differs from our purpose in introducing it here.1 Our intent was
to make a mathematical argument that shows what happens in the Cournot
analysis when one relaxes the assumption of atomism. We have not attempted
to model any form of conjectural variation or reaction by the firms in the agent
model, and in any case the agent model does not have the atomistic constraint
imposed upon it.
We appreciate the reference [3] Anglin provided, but note that as they started
from the incorrect differential condition (∂pii/∂qi = 0), their results are not
applicable.
1This can be interpreted as firms anticipating what their competitors might do, although
we tend to regard it as describing reactions to competitors in a “time-free” model, so the
variation is not conjectural but reactionary.
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In the next section, we present a strategic response argument that does not
make use of the conjectural variation idea at all.
6 Evolution of dqi/dQ
In our paper [4], we introduced a homogenous conjectural variation parameter
∂qi/∂qj = θ. As pointed out by Anglin, this analysis makes use of the faulty
assumption dqi/dQ =
∑
j ∂qi/∂qj . To circumvent this problem, and generalise
the argument, we take the point that dqi/dQ are unconstrained endogenous
variables, and so we introduce the variables
dqi
dQ
= θi. (4)
This extends phase space from the n-dimensional space of firm production qi, i =
1 . . . n to a 2n− 1-dimensional phase space, with the constraint
∑
i
dqi
dQ
=
dQ
dQ
= 1. (5)
The θi might be thought of as a firm’s response function to changing industry
output.
With the usual profit formula (1) the maximum profit for a single firm ob-
tains at the zero of
dpii
dQ
= P
dqi
dQ
+ qi
dP
dQ
−MC(qi)
dqi
dQ
= Pθi + qiP
′ −MC(qi)θi (6)
We may sum equation (6) over i to obtain
P +QP ′ −
∑
i
MC(qi)θi = 0. (7)
Given a fixed market partition {si = qi/Q}, the maximum profit obtains at
the zero of the derivative of the total industry profit
d
dQ
(
QP −
∑
i
∫ siQ
MC(q)dq
)
= P +QP ′ −
∑
i
siMC(qi) = 0. (8)
Comparing equations (7) and (8), we see that the individual firm profit is sub-
maximal unless ∑
i
MC(qi)(si − θi) = 0. (9)
The vector (mi = MC(qi)) lies in the positive cone R
n+ (ie mi > 0, ∀i). The
vector (ti = si − θi) lies on a hyperplane passing through the origin, and per-
pendicular to the unit vector (1, 1, ...1), since
∑
i ti = 0. Condition (9) can be
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thought of as a dot product m · t = 0. This condition can only be satisfied if m
is proportional to the unit vector (ie marginal cost is constant) or t = 0, which
implies θi = si, ∀i. Given a particular partition of the market, profit of all firms
will always be increased by moving the θi variables closer to the market share
si.
Substituting this condition for variable marginal cost into (6) gives:
siP + siQP
′ − siMC(siQ) = 0 (10)
which can only be simultaneously satisfied for all i if the market is equiparti-
tioned (si = 1/n).
The Keen equilibrium obtains on the manifold where θi = 1/n. Substituting
this into equation (6), one obtains
P −MC(qi) + nqiP
′ = 0 (11)
which can be rearranged to yield
MRi −MC = P (Q) + qiP
′(Q)−MC(qi) =
n− 1
n
(P −MC(qi)) (12)
where MRi is the marginal revenue of the firm.
When marginal cost is constant, equation (7) implies that the industry op-
erates at the monopoly pricing at equilibrium:
P +QP ′ −MC = 0 (13)
and from (6) we see
qi = θiQ (14)
Only when θi = 1/n does this coincide with the Keen equilibrium.
We may rearrange equation (11) to give
qi =
MC(qi)− P
nP ′
(15)
If the right hand side of this equation were a monotonic decreasing function
of qi, ∀qj , j 6= i, then a unique solution exists for qi, the market is equiparti-
tioned between firms and the Keen equilibrium coincides with monopoly pric-
ing. However, if multiple solutions to (15) exist,2 then the market need not
be equipartitioned, and in general the Keen equilibrium differs from monopoly
pricing. However, in the limit n→∞, assuming finite total industry output, qi
is o(1/n), so P−MC(qi) tends to some positive value, differing from competitive
pricing.
In the simple case of a linear demand curve, multiple solutions to qi can
only exist for falling marginal cost. Such markets are dominated by a scramble
2 For example with P (Q) = 10 − Q and MC(q) = 1/q, (P − MC)/P ′ exhibits a peak
value at an intermediate value, so is not monotonic. We thank Paul Anglin for providing this
example.
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for market share, as there is a distinct “economy of scale” advantage to being
market leader. The analysis presented here does not help determine what the
equilibrium state will be.
If the marginal cost function differed between firms, the result θi = si still
holds. The main difference is that the corresponding equation (10) is now firm
dependent
P +QP ′ −MCi(siQ) = 0, (16)
and the market is no longer equipartitioned at equilibrium. The equivalent of
(11) is
MRi −MCi =
Q− qi
Q
(P −MCi(qi)). (17)
7 Agent simulation
What evidence is there that the parameters θi introduced in the previous section
will undergo evolution so as to optimise the profit levels of the firms? In [5], we
introduced a simple agent based model which exhibited an interesting emergent
phenomenon where agents would lock into the same strategy of decreasing pro-
duction to improve profits. At the start of the simulation, agents are randomly
increasing or decreasing their production levels without affecting total industry
production much. In terms of θi, this implies |θi| ≫ 1/n, and total industry
production from equation (6) is close to competitive levels. As the emergent
lock in effect takes place, the firms are changing their production levels in the
same way, so θi = 1/n, and the system converges to the Keen equilibrium.
Qualitatively, the results of the two models do differ, with the agent model
exhibiting a range of convergent behaviour not seen in the differential case.
In the agent model, we were also able to reproduce the neoclassical result of
convergence by the firms to output levels at which each firm’s marginal cost
equaled its marginal revenue in two ways. However, neither of these accord
with the standard “Marshallian” or “Cournot” explanations. Convergence to
the Cournot output level occurred:
1. When a fraction of firms behaved irrationally, by continuing with a strat-
egy (for example, increasing output) when that strategy reduced profit in
the previous iteration. Convergence to the neoclassical expectation was
monotonic as the proportion of irrational firms was raised from zero to
25 percent; from 25 to 50 percent, the neoclassical case applied; while
above 50 percent irrational behaviour, the firms and the system followed
a random walk. This result was independent of the number of firms in the
industry; and
2. As the standard deviation σ of the parameter δqi rose, as shown in our
paper. This result was also independent of the number of firms in the
industry.
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8 Conclusion
Our conclusions about the strict falsity of the Marshallian model, and the lack
of content of the Cournot model—in that while it is strictly true, actual profit-
maximizers would not play the Cournot-Nash game—still stand. We therefore
continue to assert that economics does not have a model of price setting. Blin-
der et al.[2], provides a good empirical survey of price setting practices in the
real world, and as with our model, this survey strongly contradicts accepted
neoclassical beliefs. We suggest that a good research goal for economists would
be to devise a model of competition that replicates the results of this study.
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